![]() ![]() Authenticators implementingĬTAP1/U2F are typically referred to as U2F authenticators or CTAP1 The latter was the U2F specification version used as the basisįor several portions of this specification. CTAP1/U2F may also be referred to as CTAP 1.2 CTAP1/U2F messages are recognizable by theirĪPDU-like binary structure. The CTAP1/U2F protocol, which is defined by the U2F Raw Messages This specification refers to two CTAP protocol The specifications, and is related to the W3C specification. This specification is part of the FIDO2 project which includes this CTAP and Transport layer security must be achieved. Not specify the details of how such a channel is established, nor how Mutually authenticated data transport channel. Prior to executing this protocol, the client/platform (referred to as host hereafter) and roaming authenticator (referred to as authenticator hereafter) must establish a confidential and Possible examples of user gestures include: asĪ consent button, password, a PIN, a biometric or a combination of these. In order to provide evidence of user interaction, a roamingĪuthenticator implementing this protocol is expected to have a mechanism PC) which prompts the user to interact with a roaming authenticator With a relying party (a website or native app) on some platform (e.g., a This protocol is intended to be used in scenarios where a user interacts 10.1 WebAuthn Extension Identifier Registrations.9.1 HMAC Secret Extension (hmac-secret). Authenticator Bluetooth#8.3.12.2 Bluetooth pairing: Authenticator considerations.8.3.12.1 Bluetooth pairing: Client considerations.8.3.4.3 Command, Status, and Error constants.8.3.4.2 Response from Authenticator to Client.8.3.4.1 Request from Client to Authenticator.8.3 Bluetooth Smart / Bluetooth Low Energy Technology.8.2 ISO7816, ISO14443 and Near Field Communication (NFC).8.1.8.2 HID report descriptor and device discovery.8.1.8.1 Interface and endpoint descriptors.8.1.7 Protocol version and compatibility.8.1.5.3 Transaction abort and re-synchronization.8.1.5.1 Transaction atomicity, idle and busy states.8.1.2 Protocol structure and data framing.8.1 USB Human Interface Device (USB HID).7.3 Using the CTAP2 authenticatorGetAssertion Command with CTAP1/U2F authenticators.7.2 Using the CTAP2 authenticatorMakeCredential Command with CTAP1/U2F authenticators.7 Interoperating with CTAP1/U2F authenticators.5.5.8.3 Without pinToken in authenticatorGetAssertion.5.5.8.2 Using pinToken in authenticatorGetAssertion.5.5.8.1 Using pinToken in authenticatorMakeCredential.5.5.7 Getting pinToken from the Authenticator.5.5.4 Getting sharedSecret from Authenticator.5.5.3 Getting Retries from Authenticator.5.5.2 Authenticator Configuration Operations Upon Power Up.5.3 authenticatorGetNextAssertion (0x08).1.1 Relationship to Other Specifications.Specification and to promote its widespread deployment. FIDO Alliance's role in making the Recommendation is to draw attention to the It is a stable document and may be used as reference material or cited from anotherĭocument. This document has been reviewed by FIDO Aliance Members WARRANTY OF NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED THIS FIDO ALLIANCE SPECIFICATION IS PROVIDED “AS IS” AND WITHOUT ANY and its MembersĪnd any other contributors to the Specification are not, and shall not be held, responsible in any mannerįor identifying or failing to identify any or all such third party intellectual property rights. Property rights, including without limitation, patent rights. Implementation of certain elements of this Specification may require licenses under third party intellectual If you wish to make comments regarding this document, please This document was published by the FIDO Alliance as a Proposed Standard. Latest revision of this technical report can be found in the FIDO Alliance specifications index at A list of current FIDO Alliance publications and the Other documents may supersede this document. This section describes the status of this document at the time of its publication. Each transport binding defines the details of how such transport layer connections should be set up, in a manner that meets the requirements of the application layer protocol. The application layer protocol defines requirements for such transport protocols. This specification describes an application layer protocol for communication between a roaming authenticator and another client/platform, as well as bindings of this application protocol to a variety of transport protocols using different physical media. ![]()
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